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On 5 August 1997, the Committee on 
Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir 
Ronald Hampel, issued its preliminary 
report. In part, the Hampel Committee 
represents the successor to the Cadbury 
Committee and to the Study Group on 
Directors' Remuneration (Greenbury). 
Hampel's remit, however, was a broad one 
and unlike both Cadbury and Greenbury, 
Hampel was under no immediate pressure 
to respond to some high profile crisis in 
the governance system.
ORTHODOX APPROACH
One might have hoped that Hampel 
would have used this opportunity to 
offer a deeper and more rounded review 
of corporate governance. However, in so 
far as the report has anything to say 
about the philosophy underpinning 
corporate governance, its views are 
orthodox and weakly argued. Its more 
specific proposals, addressing particular 
governance mechanisms, say little that is 
new or innovative. Rather, they largely' J o J
follow where others have led whilst 
softening the force of those proposals by 
calling for a more flexible approach to 
their enforcement.
Hampel's orthodoxy is most clearly 
reflected in its view of the purpose of 
corporate life:
'the single overriding objective shared by all 
listed companies ... is the preservation and the 
greatest practicable enhancement over time of 
their shareholders' investment.' (para. 1.16)
Although written as a descriptive 
statement the claim is in fact quite 
clearly a normative one: 'the directors' 
duty is to shareholders both present and 
future' (para. 1.18). As such, it offers 
little support for current proponents of 
'stakeholding' within corporations. To 
be sure, the report notes that:
'...companies can meet this duty and 
pursue the objective of long term shareholder 
value successfully only by developing and 
sustaining their other relationships.' 
(para. 1.18)
But this familiar homily hardly 
addresses, let alone defeats, the argument 
for stakeholding. It treats the interests of 
employees, creditors, consumers and so
on, only in an instrumental way   as a 
prerequisite to achieving the real goal of 
creating shareholder value.
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
As to the most appropriate governance 
mechanisms for achieving this 'long term
o o
shareholder value', Hampel largely 
follows in Cadbury's footsteps. Like 
Cadbury, it focuses upon a limited 
number of governance tools   the board 
and its sub-committees, shareholders and 
auditors   with little to say about the 
broader range of competing governance 
strategies   market mechanisms,O '
governmental regulatory agencies, the 
role of fiduciary duties and so on. Like 
Cadbury, it commends the use of non- 
executive directors and of specialist sub- 
committees of the board to deal with the 
remuneration and nomination of 
directors, and with the audit function.
Despite the familiarity of many of its 
proposals, however, there are several 
changes in emphasis. Hampel begins by 
claiming that there has been too much
o
concern with accountability and too little 
with ensuring prosperity; and later argues 
that the promotion of non-executives has 
overemphasised their 'monitoring role'.
More broadly, the spirit behind 
Hampel favours even greater flexibility, 
and less prescription, than, say, Cadbury 
advocated. This change is introduced in 
para. 2.1, with its clear preference for 
'principles' rather than 'more detailed 
guidelines like the Cadbury and 
Greenbury codes.' It also manifests itself 
in the report's criticisms of 'box ticking' 
(para. 1.12), its concern to 'restrict the 
regulatory burden on companies' (para. 
1.6) and finally, in its treatment of more 
specific proposals. A good example 
concerns the splitting of the role of 
chairman and CLO: 'other things being 
equal, the roles of chairman and chief 
executive are better kept separate, but 
this should not be made a firm rule' 
(para. 3.18).
CODES OF PRACTICE
One issue which prompted much 
discussion post-Cadbury concerned 
implementation and enforcement: how
do we ensure that companies, corporate 
actors and other relevant institutions 
adopt the preferred governance 
mechanisms? Will, for example, codes of 
good practice suffice, or does only law 
pack the regulatory punch to ensure real 
compliance? Hampel says little directly 
on this point. It does not, for example, 
attempt to state and defend a case for 
relying on voluntary codes, rather than 
statutory rules. However, the report's 
general commitment to flexibility seems 
logically to require a more voluntaristic 
approach, in which those to whom the 
principles of good practice are addressed 
are themselves charged with interpreting 
those principles and deciding what they 
demand in the particular circumstances 
of their company
DEEPER CONCERNS
One suspects that many will remain 
unimpressed by the content of Hampel's 
proposals, and unconvinced by the 
reasoning offered in their support. But 
there lies a deeper and more troubling 
problem that arises from the very way in 
which governance reform has been
o
effected over the past few years. 
Responsibility for reform has been semi- 
privatised, with the initiative firmly in the 
hands of fairly small and unrepresentative 
committees, championing a narrow range 
of interests, and apparently proceeding 
more on the basis of casual empiricism 
than well grounded theories. In 
consequence, large parts of the 
governance debate have become effectively 
marginalised from the process of 
governance reform. That committees in 
the mould of Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel should be so litde concerned 
with, say, arguments for stakeholding, for a 
broader view of the corporation's social 
responsibilities, or for the centrality of law 
as a regulatory tool, is not entirely 
surprising. But the governance of those 
large corporations which so dominate our 
economy is one of the most important 
questions of social policy. Furnishing 
appropriate answers requires a wide and 
inclusive debate, in which the government 
must inevitably resume a central role. ©
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